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ABSTRACT

Previous studies have shown that people use environmental cues to identify the
intentions of others with whom they interact. This study sought to examine how an
observer’s incidental memory for strangers was influenced by the emotional expression
displayed by the stranger as well as the type of action in which the stranger was involved.
Incidental memory was assessed using a memory task that first asked observers to view a
series of faces (“targets”) that were each paired with an action. Later, observers were
asked if they recognized previously viewed targets amongst novel targets. Incidental
memory tasks are used to investigate whether or not observers (a) recognize where they
had seen targets that they had been exposed to earlier (a.k.a. source memory) and (b)
recognize the details that are idiosyncratic to a given target (e.g., facial expression,
behavior within their environment, etc.). Overall, as expected in an incidental memory
task, observers displayed a source memory advantage for novel targets that were not
originally presented. Inconsistent with previous research, observers’ memory for the
targets was not greatly impacted by the nature of the activity that they were involved in
during the early phase of the experiment (e.g., deed or misdeed). However, the emotional
expression displayed by the target did have a substantial influence on the observer’s
ability to recognize the target. Specifically, observers recognized targets the best when
they had been previously seen displaying negative emotions. In addition, although prior
ii

research suggests that individuals who perform good deeds are not readily recognized
relative to those who perform bad deeds, observers were far superior at recognizing
targets that performed good deeds but that also expressed negative emotions. The
inconsistency between the target’s emotional expression and action may have
strengthened the observer’s representation of the target, suggesting that observers may be
more sensitive to the actions performed by others if ill-intentions are perceived through
their emotional displays.

Key Words: emotion, action, incidental memory
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
People themselves are often described as being a “good guy” or a “bad guy”
depending on their actions and, more importantly, their intentions. Likewise, research
has shown that negative experiences affect us more than positive ones (Baumeister et al.,
2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Baumeister and colleagues pointed out that negative
events have a larger effect psychologically than positive events, if both are equal (for
example, losing twenty dollars affects you more than finding twenty dollars), possibly
because humans have evolved to be more attuned to negative outcomes to avoid
unpleasant experiences in the future. Baumeister and colleagues believe that animals that
were more sensitive to negative stimuli were better able to survive and pass on their
genes. Baumeister and colleagues also believe that when forming an impression of
someone, we focus on and give more weight to the negative information about that
individual. The hypothesis that “bad is stronger than good” definitely applies to memory.
Observers remember bad behaviors better than good behaviors when viewing pictures of
individuals performing these good or bad deeds (Baumeister et al.). One explanation for
this outcome is that negative behaviors capture more of an observer’s attention, which
allows for a stronger memory trace to form, consciously or nonconsciously. The present
study investigates how an observer’s incidental memory for a target actor is influenced by
1

the emotion that the actor is expressing as well as by how socially acceptable the actor’s
behavior is.
Forming Impressions
When interacting with people who perform good deeds or bad deeds, the initial
behaviors that one observes can leave a lasting first impression that may bias subsequent
interactions. Vital to first impressions is the spotlight effect that negative behaviors have
on one’s assessment of a stranger’s character. Specifically, Skowronski and Carlston
(1987) found that people show a negativity bias when forming first impressions. In other
words, negative behaviors were found to be more diagnostic (i.e., more relevant) when
forming first impressions of strangers than were positive behaviors. Moreover, if the
negative behavior was more extreme in nature (e.g., it is not at all socially acceptable
versus justifiable), then that behavior was more likely to be factored into the participant’s
judgment of the actor.
In addition to weighting the potential for harm that may result from an actor’s
behaviors, observers’ first impressions are also greatly influenced by environmental cues
(such as facial features) that signal the true intentions of the target’s actions. Ames and
colleagues (2004) found that participants analyzed the intentions of helpers (or people
who perform good deeds) based on three factors: the helper's affective state, their role in
the situation, and the helper’s potential for gain. Participants were more likely to interact
with a helper and reciprocate in kind if the helper acted based on a desire to create
positive affect. However, they were less likely to interact with the helper if he ran a cost2

benefit analysis to determine what he may gain from the situation or if the helper acted
because his role obligated him to do so. In addition, upon receiving help, people
generally feel indebted no matter what the intentions of a helper might be, but they only
feel grateful if the person helped out of benevolence rather than a drive to advance
themselves (Tsang, 2006). From a social standpoint, relationships can be facilitated by
displaying good behaviors towards others, but there is no guarantee that good behavior is
necessarily memorable behavior. In fact, prior research suggests that, regardless of how
one feels about an actor, how memorable that actor’s behavior actually may be is
dependent upon the extent to which the behavior runs counter to social norms.
Deeds Versus Misdeeds
The current study explores the hypothesis that misdeeds label an actor in a way
(i.e., negativity bias) that makes him (or her) incidentally more memorable when one
comes into contact with that actor during future interactions. In incidental memory
research in which an observer is told to passively observe a target rather than carefully
study his or her behavior, the exact features of a target’s misdeed (e.g., cheating) are not
later remembered. Rather, a more general negative feeling about that person is stored and
reactivated by the observer (Mehl & Buchner, 2007). Not surprisingly, one’s emotional
intuition is more accurate immediately after being exposed to a misbehaving target than if
examined one week later. This is consistent with a shallow arousal (or surprise) based
explanation for enhanced recognition in which the impression of a “bad guy” is
temporarily accessible to the participant so that the target can be generally categorized as
3

someone to avoid.
To further examine the depth of memory that people have for those who perform
misdeeds, Buchner and colleagues conducted a follow-up study that focused on source
memory (where the participant remembers seeing the target) for cheaters. The authors
were interested in determining if the location of a cheater (e.g., initial exposure in the
study phase of an incidental memory task) would be remembered even if the details of
the transgression could not be bound to the perpetrator. For each target, participants
viewed a photo of a unique neutral facial expression paired with a written description of a
deed or misdeed (Buchner, Bell, Mehl, & Musch, 2009). Participants did not show
enhanced memory for the type of behavior performed by a target (i.e., acceptable or not
acceptable), but they did, in fact, display better recognition memory for transgressors
who had been presented in the initial study phase. Those who had performed good deeds
were less memorable. These findings held regardless of the severity of the deed or
misdeed. Interestingly, the authors discovered a similar outcome when repeating the
experiment but pairing deeds and misdeeds with fictitious names rather than neutral facial
expressions (Bell & Buchner, 2009).
In sum, these findings support the authors’ earlier research and demonstrate that
some minimum level of processing was taking place to build a superficial memory trace
of bad guys found in the participants’ environment. What is unclear about these findings
is the type of information that people incorporate into their mental representations of
transgressors. It appears that only very limited information (i.e., the location of the
4

individual but not specific features of the individual’s action) is available to people when
asked to recognize those who have committed bad deeds relative to new targets or those
who had performed good deeds. Given the differences that exist in the methods of each
study (e.g., faces versus names, source memory versus likeability judgments, etc.), the
similarity in findings is remarkable. In the current study, we introduced a more salient
emotional cue (the target’s emotional facial expression) to assist in the feature binding
process that takes place when evaluating strangers. A more salient cue should act to
disambiguate the intentions of each target, and emotional expressions should create an
additional feature to which the participant can associate the target’s identity and behavior.
Emotion and Memory
In the current study, we examine whether or not salient emotional cues act to
strengthen the memory traces of strangers who are only briefly introduced to participants
through an incidental memory task. Mather (2007) believes that the emotional
components of a stimulus (especially when arousing) can serve to capture attentional
resources and drag them away from other non-emotional components. Consequently,
memory for non-arousing, non-emotional stimuli and other background information will
be inhibited. This emotional enhancement hypothesis is supported by research showing
that source memory is strengthened for arousing images presented amongst non-arousing,
neutral pictures (Mather & Nesmith, 2008). The authors, however, also point out that
potential gains in memory that stem from the emotional features of a stimulus are bound
to that specific stimulus and do not necessarily interfere with memory for other stimuli.
5

Consistent with this interpretation, participants in eye-witness memory studies
have been found to use the emotional nature of a stimulus to build an enriched memory
trace that later facilitates the accurate reconstruction of the stimulus at retrieval. For
example, Christianson et al. (1991) showed participants a set of slides that depicted a
specific event that they would later be asked to describe. Embedded in this set was a
critical slide that was either non-arousing or which elicited an emotional response from
the participant (e.g., bike riding sequence in which the emotional slide displayed head
trauma). Associated with this critical slide was a key feature that was important to the
recreation of the event at retrieval. Participants who viewed the emotionally evocative
slide were more likely to focus on this critical detail found in both sequences. This is
consistent with Mather’s suggestion that an emotional feature of a stimulus may capture
one’s attention, reducing the effort that is required to bind that feature to a memory trace
of the stimulus and thus increasing the odds of later remembering the stimulus.
Emotion can similarly enhance one’s memory even when the memory component
of a task is actually incidental and not intentional. In incidental memory tasks,
participants are sometimes asked to classify stimuli using shallow or deep levels of
processing (i.e., thinking about characteristics of the word versus thinking about the
meaning of the word), but are not specifically told to memorize the stimuli (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972). Following this classification phase (a.k.a. a study phase or an exposure
phase), participants complete a surprise recognition test (or test phase) in which they
indicate whether or not each member of a given stimulus set had appeared in the
6

classification phase. Recognition memory is typically better for stimuli that were
classified under deep processing instructions than it is for those that were classified under
shallow processing instructions. However, if emotional stimuli capture one’s attention,
then perhaps memory for emotional items presented under shallow processing
instructions (“write down the vowels in the word”) will be better remembered than nonemotional items presented under these same conditions. This is exactly what took place
when participants were asked study emotional and neutral words using shallow, moderate
(“write down the color that the word brought to mind”), and deep (“write down how
positive or negative the word is”) processing instructions (Reber, Perrig, Flammer, &
Walther, 1994). The emotional flavor of a given stimulus drew attention to the stimulus
when the participants’ instructions only required a minimal investment of resources. In
other words, the features of the stimulus automatically commanded attention above and
beyond the superficial analysis of the stimulus that the participants performed.
Positive Versus Negative Emotion
In the current study, the effects that positive and negative emotions displayed by
the stimuli have on memory accuracy were also examined. Previous research
demonstrates that negative emotional features of stimuli (e.g., words, scenes, faces, etc.)
create a stronger memory advantage than do positive features. There are a few
explanations offered for this. First, negative emotional stimuli are believed to create more
vivid memories than positive stimuli by focusing participants’ attention on key details
(Kensinger, 2007; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007). This enhanced
7

focus also can act to boost the participants’ metacognitive judgments of their memory
accuracy as well (however, over confidence can be problematic for eye-witness memory
accuracy, see Phelps & Sharot, 2008). Within the brain, negative emotion may cause
sensory processing centers to become more active (e.g., Adolphs, 2002; Mienaltowski et
al., 2011), allowing the viewer to take in more of the details of the event and have better
memory accuracy, whereas positive emotions cause the viewer to only remember the
general concept of the event and not the details (Kensinger, 2009).
In their seminal review article on the attentional and memorial advantage
conferred to negative stimuli, Rozin and Royzman (2001) propose that a negativity bias
often emerges in psychology for four reasons. First, there is negative potency, or, more
simply stated, negativity potentiates processing. If you have two equal entities, a
negative one will influence an individual more than a positive one. Second, negative
emotional experiences become increasingly more negative as their impending doom
looms nearer. Timing can matter because, as a negative event draws near, an individual
may have to activate a defensive response in order to maintain a stable sense of wellbeing. Third, negativity dominates our simultaneous experiences of positive and negative
emotions. Finally, negative emotions are more complex and differentiated; negative
emotions promote deeper thought and often necessitate more cognitive effort to
ameliorate than positive emotions (e.g., surprise, glee).

8

Predictions
For the current study, we wanted to replicate and extend prior incidental memory
research examining participants’ source memory for target actors who performed good
deeds or bad deeds by systematically varying the emotional expressions of the target
actors. Participants viewed photos of multiple actors, each of which portrayed positive,
negative, or neutral expressions and were paired with a unique deed or misdeed.
Consistent with prior research, we expected to find better source memory for actors who
committed misdeeds than for those who committed good deeds (e.g., Buchner et al.,
2009). Given the negativity bias noted in previous memory studies (Baumeister et al.,
2001; Christianson et al., 2001; Mather, 2007; Mather & Nesmith, 2008; Rozin &
Royzman, 2001; Skrowronski & Carlston, 1987), target actors who expressed negative
emotion were also expected to be better remembered than targets expressing positive
emotions. This prediction was examined both in terms of (a) the participants’ source
memory as well as (b) the participants’ memory for the acceptable and unacceptable
nature of an actor’s action if the actor was accurately recognized from his or her initial
appearance in the study phase of the incidental memory task.
Furthermore, we know that when forming a first impression, people use
environmental cues (e.g., behaviors, emotions, and/or the combination of both) to
determine the intentions of a helper or new acquaintance. If we perceive the intentions as
being negative, we should be able to notice and remember that information for future
interactions. Moreover, the behavior/emotion combinations implemented in the current
9

study are a novel addition to this field. From them, negative intentions can be examined
from a more nuanced perspective. Specifically, aside from interpreting the negativity
from negative facial expressions and misdeeds, observers may also be sensitive to
inconsistencies emerging from the individual target’s emotional expression and action.
For instance, if the target is performing a good deed but expressing anger, an observer
should recognize the target’s insincerity. In fact, such insincerity may boost the
observer’s memory for the target even though, in past research, targets performing good
deeds were not remembered to the same degree as targets performing misdeeds. Also, if
the target is performing a misdeed but expressing happiness, the observer should
recognize the target’s depravity. Again, if the observer recognizes the inconsistency in
the target’s expression and action, the additional effort invested in considering the
inconsistency should enhance his or her memory for the target. As suggested by previous
incidental memory research, memory performance should be best under those conditions
where a participant spontaneously directs attention to a given face and action pairing to
bind the details in their memory because this pair is particularly interesting (or attention
grabbing).

10

CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Participants
The sample used in the current experiment consisted of 25 college students (13
women, 12 men) aged 18 to 21 from diverse racial backgrounds (76% Caucasian, 8%
African American, 4% Asian American, and 12% mixed heritage). All of the participants
were students at Western Kentucky University, and each received course credit for their
participation. Informed consent was obtained from each participant before the
experiment began (WKU Human Subjects Review: HS10-217). The participants’ visual
acuity scores ranged from 20/20 to 20/50, indicating that the participants had adequate
acuity to detect those facial features relevant to emotion recognition.
Incidental Memory Task
Phase One (Study Phase). Participants were presented with 48 trials where they
would view a face of a target actor that was expressing either a positive (happy), neutral,
or negative (angry) expression. Under the picture of the actor’s face, there was a caption
that described an action. The action would either be a good deed (“deed”) such as “S.G.
bought someone lunch who didn't have money” or a bad deed (“misdeed”) such as “G.H.
plagiarized on a paper for class.” Deeds and misdeeds were developed and normed in
conjunction with an honors augmentation project to (a) ensure the implementation of
actions with a wide range of positive and negative impact, and (b) ensure that the actions
11

were actually activities that the participants were familiar with from their own
experiences. The participant was asked to answer a number of questions about each
photo and caption pairing. First, participants identified which emotional expression
(positive, negative, or neutral) was displayed by the actor. This ensured that the
participant examined the actor’s facial expression. Participants were also asked to rate
how socially acceptable the action was on a scale of 1 (Completely Unacceptable) to 7
(Completely Acceptable), ensuring that the participant considered the target's action.
Lastly, the participant was asked to rate how likeable that person was on a scale of 1 (Not
at all likeable) to 4 (Extremely likeable). Out of the 48 trials, there were 16 neutral, 16
positive, and 16 negative targets. Each emotion had an equivalent number of male and
female faces (8 of each), as well as an equal number of Caucasian and African American
faces (8 of each). All photos were adapted from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of
Emotion (Beaupré & Hess, 2005), from the NimStim MacArthur Foundation stimulus set
(Tottenham et al., 2009), and from Google Image searches (all photos were open-access).
The pictures were presented in grayscale using E-Prime stimulus presentation software
and possessed a resolution of 500 x 500 pixels.
Phase Two (Test Phase). After completing the first phase of the experiment,
participants completed approximately 11 minutes of filler tasks (tests of verbal ability and
inductive reasoning, or the ETS Vocabulary Test and Letter Sets Test, respectively;
Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) before moving into the second phase of the
incidental memory task. In this phase, the participants' memory for the faces in Phase
One was measured via a source memory task. Participants viewed 96 faces, half of
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which were new to the experiment and half of which were taken from Phase One (old).
For each face, participants were asked if they recognized the person. If they did not
recognize the face, they responded “new” and that trial would end and another face
would be presented. However, if the participant did recognize the face, then they
responded “old” and rated how socially acceptable that person's action from the first
phase was. Afterwards, the participant was prompted to recall the exact action and type it
into a response window that popped up on the computer display. If the participant could
not remember the action, they were prompted to type “IDK” (initialism for “I don't
know”) in the box. There were a total of 96 trials that included 48 new faces (16 each of
positive, neutral, and negative faces, distributed evenly across race and gender) and the
48 photos from the first phase. In addition to analyzing the participants’ memory for the
source of each actor (old – Phase 1; new – Phase 2), we also focused on those trials
where the participants correctly identified an old face (one from Phase 1) as “old.” This
allows us to determine if memory for non-source characteristics (the action for each
target) is better given the emotional expressions found on the actors’ face.
Procedure
Participants provided informed consent before completing Phase One of the
incidental memory task. After Phase One, participants completed filler tasks before
proceeding on to Phase Two of the incidental memory task. At the end of the session,
participants completed a demographics questionnaire and a test of visual acuity. Overall,
the session lasted approximately 60 minutes.
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
This study used a 3 (target’s facial expression of emotion: positive, negative,
neutral) by 2 (action: deed, misdeed) by 2 (source: old/Phase One, new/Phase Two)
within-subjects design. An initial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to
examine the impact that emotion had on the source memory of the targets. Subsequent
ANOVAS were performed to examine the influence that each target's behavior and facial
expression of emotion had on the number of correctly recognized items from Phase One
for each within-subject condition.
As mentioned in the method section above, participants viewed 48 targets,
representing 48 emotion/action pairings, in the study phase (Phase One) of the incidental
memory task. Of these, 24 involved targets performing deeds and 24 involved targets
performing misdeeds. Each of these sets of 24 trials can be further divided using the
emotions expressed by the target. Specifically, there were 8 trials for each emotion
within each action type. This means that, when examining the influence of emotion and
action type on memory accuracy, the range of possible accurate responses can range from
0 to 8 (emotion by action) or 16 (emotion alone) or 24 (action alone). In the test phase, in
addition to viewing the same 48 targets presented in the study phase (“old”), participants
viewed 48 new targets. Of these, 16 expressed positive emotions, 16 expressive negative,
and 16 displayed no emotion (i.e., neutral).

14

Source Memory from Incidental Memory Task
Recognizing targets in the test phase. A 2 (source: old, new) by 3 (emotion:
positive, negative, neutral) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the participants’
frequency of accurate responses in the test phase of the incidental memory task. It
revealed a main effect of source, F(1, 24) = 1088.1 (p < .001, ηp2 = .79) and emotion,
F(2,48) = 19.7 (p < .001, ηp2 = .27). These main effects were qualified by a significant
interaction between source and emotion, F(2,48) = 17.8 (p = .002, ηp2 = .24). In the test
phase, participants correctly identified more items only viewed in the test phase as being
new (M = 14.8, SE = 0.3) than items that they correctly identified from the study phase as
being old (M = 9.4, SE = 0.6). Please note that a participant would have a perfect score if
they correctly identified 16 faces as being new and 16 faces as being old. Participants
also displayed more accurate source recognition for targets displaying negative emotion
(M = 12.8, SE = 0.4) than targets displaying positive emotion (M = 11.6, SE = 0.4) or no
emotion (M = 11.8, SE = 0.4). The interaction emerged because participants’ accurate
classification of targets viewed only in the test phase was not impacted by the targets’
emotional expressions (Mpositive = 14.8, SEpositive = 0.3; Mnegative = 14.8, SEnegative = 0.3;
Mneutral = 14.7, SEneutral = 0.3), but participants were more accurate at recognizing targets
from the study phase when those targets were expressing negative emotions (Mpositive =
8.4, SEpositive = 0.6; Mnegative = 10.8, SEnegative = 0.7; Mneutral = 8.9, SEneutral = 0.7).
Emotion and action type influence the source memory of targets viewed in the
study phase. A 3 (emotion: positive, negative, neutral) by 2 (action: deed, misdeed)
within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the number of items that participants correctly
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identified as having first appeared in the study phase (i.e., “old” is correct response and
“new” is incorrect response). This analysis revealed a main effect of emotion, F(2,48) =
10.0 (p < .001, ηp2 = .29). Participants were more accurate at recognizing the targets in
the test phase when the targets had expressed negative emotions in the study phase,
relative to expressing positive emotion or no emotion. Please note that a perfect score
would be 8 correctly identified targets per category. The means and standard errors for
each condition are depicted in Figure 1, separately by action type and emotion. Although
no significant main effect of action emerged, F(1,24) = 2.3 (p = .15, ηp2 = .09), the mean
difference suggested that there was a trend accounting for a meaningful amount of
variance such that misdeeds (M = 4.9, SE = 0.3) were more accurately recognized than
deeds (M = 4.5, SE = 0.3). There was no significant interaction between emotion and
action, F(2,48) = 0.5, n.s.
Emotion influences recognition of targets over and above the impact of action
type. To get a better sense for the impact that emotion had on the participants’
recognition accuracy, we examined the participants’ responses in order to isolate only
those where (a) the participant correctly identified a target as having appeared in the
study phase (i.e., “old”) and (b) the participant correctly identified the target as having
performed a socially acceptable (deed) or unacceptable (misdeed) action in the study
phase. A 2 (action: deed, misdeed) by 3 (emotion: positive, negative, neutral) ANOVA
was run on the resulting frequencies. The analysis revealed that there was a main effect
of emotion, F(2,48) = 10.9 (p = .019, ηp2 = .31) and a rather marginal main effect of
action type, F(1,24) = 2.6 (p < .12, ηp2 = .10). The means and standard errors for each
16

condition are depicted in Figure 2, separately by action type and emotion. Overall,
participants displayed better memory for targets expressing negative emotion than those
expressing positive or no emotion. Also, there was a trend for participants to remember
targets who committed misdeeds better than those who committed deeds. However, this
trend did not reach significance.
Summary
During the test phase, participants displayed better recognition for the source of
novel targets (“new”) than they did for the source of those that were previously seen
(“old”). Moreover, “old” negative targets were recognized better than were “old”
positive targets or “old” targets that displayed no emotion. Although there was not
enough power to detect significant differences in participant recognition based on action
type, there was a trend for participants to display better source memory for targets
performing misdeeds than for those performing deeds. Across multiple levels of analysis,
however, memory for targets was generally better when the targets expressed negative
emotion than when they expressed positive emotion or no emotion at all.

17

CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
This study was conducted to investigate how incidental memory for target
strangers was influenced by the emotion expressed by these individuals as well as by the
actions that they have purportedly performed in their community. Incidental memory is
particularly important in this study because people use it in day to day activities if they
run across something in their environment that at first seems inconsequential but then
later becomes the focus of memory retrieval. As expected in an incidental memory task,
participants were able to classify faces unique to the test phase (or novel targets) as being
“new” better than they were able to classify “old” faces correctly. Unexpectedly, in the
conditions where targets were correctly identified as “old,” the deed or misdeed that
targets committed had no significant effect on memory accuracy. There was, however, a
trend to suggest that the source of targets committing misdeeds would be better
remembered than the source of those performing good deeds. Although this finding is
underpowered, it does support prior research examining source memory for transgressors
(Buchner et al., 2009). Conversely, it also supports findings from eye-witness memory
research that suggests that the level of detail that people incidentally remember from
events is low (Roediger & McDermott, 2000). Our findings also extend past research by
demonstrating that negative expressions generally had a greater impact on source
memory than did positive or neutral expressions did, and memory accuracy for “old”
faces correctly identified as “old” faces was aided by the target’s negative expressions.
The findings from the current study partly suggest that the type of action
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performed by the target can impact memory accuracy in a way that goes beyond source
memory. Specifically, it appears that participants focused more on the emotions being
expressed by the target if they were negative, regardless of whether the negative target
was performing a good deed or a misdeed, and thus were better able to remember
negative faces. This is inconsistent with prior research that merely found a source
memory effect. On the other hand, it does suggest that the participants in the current
experiment formed a deeper representation of the targets that included the emotions that
they were expressing. A possible explanation for this is that negative emotional
expressions captured the participants’ attention and facilitated the allotment of processing
resources to the negative targets. We had predicted that this would also likely occur in
cases where the action and emotion were inconsistent. Interestingly, our predictions were
only partly supported in that recognition accuracy was better when the target was
displaying an insincere emotion/action combination (i.e., displaying a negative
expression while engaged in a good deed) relative to neutral targets performing deeds or
misdeeds. However, we did not find the expected boost to recognition memory when the
target’s emotion/action combination reflected depravity (i.e., expressing positive emotion
while committing a misdeed).
This participant-centered account is consistent with the interpretation that the
participants considered targets who expressed negative emotions to be “trouble makers”
and possibly experienced increased arousal. More importantly, these findings suggest
that Buchner and colleagues overlooked a powerful factor (emotion) that may be as
predictive (if not more so) of a person’s memory for a “bad guy.” As reviewed in the
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introduction, emotion builds additional context that participants can use to bind the faces
and actions more efficiently in their memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Future research
should examine the extent to which emotion expressed by the target either (a) lowers the
threshold for information processing by attracting attention to the target/caption pairing
or (b) creates arousal that focuses the participants attention on the key details of the
stimuli in this incidental memory task. These are two competing accounts for the
interface between emotion and cognition.
Aside from this novel outcome, it is important to recognize that participants were
able to correctly characterize targets in the test phase as having performed good deeds or
bad deeds. Specifically, this was highlighted in the results section above when reporting
on how well participants were able to recognize a face in Phase Two and identify what
kind of action the target committed in Phase One. In Phase Two, participants were able
to identify the type of action well, even though many of the actions and emotions were
inconsistent. This means that the participants were identifying the action based on their
memory of the target in Phase One and not on the emotion being expressed by the target.
Past research has found an increase of memory accuracy for source memory based on
action, but no studies have found an increase in memory of the action itself prior to the
current study. Although our findings are not definitive, with a larger sample, there would
be enough power to detect differences in memory for targets performing deeds and
misdeeds. Future studies should examine the exact details that participants do re-create
when judging the targets at test. A better understanding of the contents of the observers’
representations of the targets may help legal councils to establish procedures for
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improving the veracity of eye-witness testimony.
It is also worth mentioning that, when participants believed that a novel target that
was only presented in the test phase was also presented earlier in the experimental
session, they falsely recalled the target as having performed a misdeed (i.e., represents
16% of all of the trials involving novel distractor targets in Phase Two). In fact, all
incorrect identifications of a target presented only in Phase Two as being “old” involved
the participant believing that the target had performed a misdeed (no matter what
expression the target was expressing). This speaks to how sensitive humans are to
misdeeds in their environment. Given the aforementioned findings and the low
recognition of targets that performed good deeds, it is reasonable to assume that the
current sample was much more focused on the targets’ potential for displaying negativity
and being engaged in misdeeds.
What this study adds to the existing body of literature is evidence to support the
notion that negative emotion is a strong cue for remembering a target. Negative emotion
aids memory in all cases, possibly allowing features of the target to be bound better than
those for targets who express positive or neutral emotions. Emotion also matters more
than other aspects of the target. One explanation for this is the evolutionary advantages
created by being able to accurately identify and recall negative stimuli. For an animal to
survive long enough to pass on its genes, it has to be able to identify and avoid negative
stimuli (Baumeister et al., 2001). Emotion is closely tied to the “old” brain, including the
Limbic system, which once made up the entire brain of our ancestors prior to the
emergence of the neocortex. As the human brain has evolved, it is possible that we built
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upon the emotion center to allow us to judge the intentions of other people. This would
also explain why positive emotion and good deeds matter less, as we do not need to pay
as much attention to someone who is there to willingly help us and/or someone whom we
trust.
The present study is not without its limitations. One limitation of this study is that
the memory for target actions was very low. This might be explained by the fact that the
participants were not explicitly told to memorize the actions. Effects of race and gender
of the targets were not analyzed. Such analyses will have to be performed in the future to
determine if the participants display biases in the way that they remember the targets
(e.g., poorer recognition of individuals from a different race or better recognition of
individuals who are of the opposite sex or rated as being more attractive). Also, with a
larger sample size, we would have more power to detect the possible impact that target
action type has on participant recognition of the targets. Another limitation is that all of
the photographs were presented in grayscale rather than in color. This can be problematic
given that some emotional cues are derived by looking for signs of reddening the eyes
and cheeks. A final limitation is that the emotions were all static and not dynamic.
Conclusions
It has been said that actions speak louder than words, or in this case, conveyed
emotion, but this study does not support that idiom. We do base some of our judgments
of people on their overt actions, but, once we have information to form an impression of a
person, often times we simply base our judgments on emotion. When we do use actions
as a basis, however, misdeeds are more often remembered than deeds. This might be
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caused by the deeper processing that is required to judge people by their actions (e.g.,
integrating several behaviors with the intentions for their behaviors and the target’s role
in the situation, etc.) and so we rely on easily available emotional cues (e.g., frowns and
angry scowls) to make our judgments.
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Figure 1
Figure 1. Source Accuracy by Action Type and Emotion Expression
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Figure 2
Source Accuracy by Action Type and Emotion Expression for Targets Correctly Identified
as "Old" and as Acceptable/Unacceptable
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Appendix A
List of Deeds
A.Y. mowed the yard for a neighbor who couldn't do it themselves.
T.G. helped and supported a friend who overcame a drug addiction.
G.B. took care of a hospitalized friend's pet dog.
E.W. gave someone spare change for laundry.
W.J. volunteered for an inner city outreach organization.
W.F. read a story to a sick child in a hospital.
J.V. helped a friend move their belongings to college.
D.G. comforted someone who was stressed.
S.G. bought someone lunch who didn't have money.
M.J. babysat so a married couple could go on a date.
M.T. dove into a pool to save a child who was drowning.
K.M. bought food for a friend who couldn't afford to shop.
H.D. donated old clothing to a charity.
D.Y. let someone use their phone in an emergency.
T.I. gave a lost person directions and showed them where to go.
D.W. drove a friend to the store on a rainy day.
I.D. sent cards to our armed service men and women at Christmastime.
Q.I. helped someone change a flat tire.
Q.D. rescued a dog from the animal shelter before it was put down.
L.A. helped a friend with a paper they had trouble with.
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M.D. returned a lost wallet without taking any money.
L.E. carried groceries to a car for an elderly person.
J.Y. gave helpful advice to someone with a problem.
F.H. helped someone with their algebra homework.
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Appendix B
List of Misdeeds
W.F. broke something that belonged to someone else and denied it.
Y.B. ran over their neighbor's dog and didn't stop.
F.G. cheated on their significant other.
J.H. murdered their parents with a hatchet.
K.U. used someone's phone to call long distance without telling them.
E.F. cut in front of people in line at the grocery store.
J.J. physically forced themselves on someone at the end of a date.
V.F. blackmailed someone with very personal information.
A.D. made a mean comment about someone with a disability.
W.I. lied on taxes about donating to charity.
D.A. didn't leave a tip for a good waiter.
R.G. knowingly smoked in a non-smoking area.
G.H. plagiarized on a paper for class.
S.D. loudly used their phone during a movie in a theater.
F.K. talked about their inheritance at a funeral.
G.U. stole a car from a parking lot.
F.W. left a friend at a party without transportation.
W.K. stole a puppy they wanted from a neighbor on their street.
P.T. left after hitting someone else's car in the parking lot.
Q.L. laughed at someone when they fell instead of helping them.
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G.S. cursed in front of children who they were watching.
U.D. drove under the influence of alcohol.
A.K. made lots of noise while their roommate was sleeping.
S.R. stole money from friends while visiting them.
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